Walking a tightrope: SA, Africa and the UN

Eddy Maloka and Bhekinkosi Moyo present a plan to secure permanent African representation on the Security Council.

Summary - The United Nations (UN) Millennium Review Summit (September 2005) was a watershed event for Africa but the outcome was disappointing from a number of points of view, notably that it delayed the reform and expansion of the Security Council.

One reason is the common African position, “The Ezulwini Consensus”, which prevents member states from articulating their individual positions and interests.

Africa is an integral part of the UN system so it would be counter-productive if it were now to lose the opportunity to be represented on the Security Council.

The expansion of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) heralded a reform agenda, one major element of which was to highlight the issues of representation and alignment of power relations among the UN’s principal organs. It is in the context of this element, which is associated with developing countries that the emergence of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) should be seen. Nepad was crafted as a framework around which the international community should concentrate its efforts to deal with Africa’s special needs.

From an African perspective, two categories of reform have dominated recent Security Council discourse: development, security and human rights and a package of institutional reforms. In a recent report Secretary General Kofi Annan provided the context for the AU’s engagement with the reform agenda, one of the highlights of which was a shift from the 1997 OAU Harare Declaration proposing a rotational model for the enlargement of the Security Council to the Ezulwini Consensus, based on permanent membership with the right to a veto. It is the insistence on veto rights, a position on which the AU differs from the G4 (India, Brazil, Japan and German) and the “United for Consensus” groups, that has contributed to the postponement of reform.

Instead of crafting its stance to enable capable African countries to adopt individual positions the AU confined all African member states to one approach, with the result that countries with the economic power and capacity to represent the continent have had to associate themselves with the Ezulwini Consensus whether or not it compromises their individual interests. The result of the AU’s intransigence was the rejection of the G4 proposal, which would have led to some reform of the Security Council. Deferring the veto issue might have put Africa in a better bargaining position with the G4. The AU should have opted for a three-step approach: first, securing a deal on reform, particularly Security Council enlargement; second, restraining the use of the veto by those who wield it; and third, working towards the scrapping of the veto or its extension to new permanent members. It is an approach that could still be implemented as the AU begins new negotiations on reform of the Security Council.

Another stumbling block was the absence of consensus on the selection criteria for African members of the Security Council. Such criteria should include:

  • the capacity to represent Africa and discharge its responsibilities effectively;
  • the capacity to promote development, peace, security and stability in Africa;
  • strong democratic credentials;
  • a reasonable level of political stability and stable state institutions;
  • a demonstrated commitment to Pan-African ideals and support of the programmes of the AU;
  • global and continental respect and recognition;
  • a demonstrated commitment to paying assessed contributions to both the AU and the UN.

The AU should throw its weight behind the entire proposed reform package and the implementation of the summit outcomes instead of focusing exclusively on the veto issue.

Although the summit did not achieve everything the world had hoped for it did make important progress across broad fronts. The UN is important to Africa as a forum to advance development, peace and security, debt and trade issues, and for the transformation of the Bretton Woods institutions. The fact that the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration and the outcome document for the September summit both had a dedicated section on Africa’s special needs should indicate to Africa that the UN is worth more than two seats on the Security Council.

The United Nations (UN) is an important institution for Africa in areas of development, democracy and institution building, peace and security support, and giving Africa a voice through the UN General Assembly. The UN Millennium Review Summit (September 2005) was a watershed event for Africa and her special needs. Regrettably, the outcome of the summit was not what many had hoped for, even though it recognised peace and collective security, development and human rights as pillars of the UN system and foundations for collective security1. While the outcome of the summit committed the UN to development, the establishment of the Peace Building Commission, the Human Rights Council and other institutional and cultural reforms, it did not reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism, it ignored disarmament and non-proliferation and prevaricated on the reform and expansion of the UN Security Council.

This article seeks to discuss the UN reform agenda in the light of the African Union’s common position, usually referred to as “The Ezulwini Consensus”2. We interrogate this position and wonder whether or not some African member states that have the capacity and the clout to represent the continent were not subjected to the interests of the AU collective. Is it not time to revisit the common African position and make it more flexible so that member states are able to articulate their individual positions and interests without being seen as breaking ranks or dissenting?

We ask these questions because Africa is an integral part of the UN system. It would be counter-productive if Africa were to lose the opportunity of representation on the UN Security Council. Africa and other developing nations have pushed for the reform and democratisation of the UN since attaining their independence. The majority of African countries joined the UN in the late 1960s and consequently put pressure on the reform agenda. The Security Council was expanded to 15 from 11; and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was enlarged first to 27 from 18 and then to 54. It is in this context therefore that the reform agenda of the UN took shape and three strands emerged:

  • Reforms were confined to administrative and bureaucratic issues especially around downsizing and streamlining of the UN;
  • Reform was defined as prioritisation and improvement of co-ordination within the UN;
  • Issues of representation and the alignment of power relations among the UN’s principal organs were placed on the primary agenda for reforms.

The third strand was associated with developing countries of which the majority were in Africa. A number of UN initiatives were established that sought to advance the different notions of reform. Of importance were the UN Millennium Declaration (2000) and the adoption of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that built on earlier programmes such as the UN Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery for Development (1986-1990) and the UN New Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s. It is in this context that we should understand the emergence of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). As an African-led initiative Nepad was crafted as a framework around which the international community, including the UN, should concentrate its efforts in dealing with Africa’s special needs. Hence from an African perspective the UN reform that dominated the discourse over recent months, while reflecting the third strand, is divided into two categories. First, a paradigm anchored in a triangular relationship between development, security and human rights, challenging unilateralism, militarism and the doctrines of regime change; second, a package of institutional reforms that reflect the first and second strands. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, better defined all three strands in his report. In this document, Annan synthesized the findings of the High Level Panel on threats, challenges and change and the Jeffery Sachs report on achieving MDGs.

Kofi Annan’s report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights3 provided the context for the AU’s engagement with the reform agenda. One of the highlights was a shift in Africa from the 1997 OAU Harare Declaration position that proposed a rotational model for the enlargement of the Security Council to the Ezulwini Consensus that is based on a permanent membership model with the right to a veto. The AU position differs from that of the G4 (India, Brazil, Japan and German) and the “United for Consensus” groups which did not stress the need for veto rights.

It is our view that although Africa’s position in the UN system has strengthened as a result of upholding the principle of developing a common African approach to global issues, the preoccupation with the reform and expansion of the UN Security Council almost overshadowed broader institutional and cultural reforms. Africa was not the primary spoiler on Security Council reform, there were additional spoilers that included the US, China and the G4 among others. Nevertheless Africa did contribute to the postponement of Security Council reform. As the largest constituent of the UN General Assembly, Africa needed to have a consensus on who would represent the continent as well as the criteria to select its representatives. Going to the UN without any of these meant that Africa fed into the interests of those, especially the permanent five (P5), that did not want reform and expansion of the Security Council.

The AU position should have been crafted in a way that would have enabled capable African countries to adopt individual positions without being seen to be breaking ranks or dissenting. The AU’s response to UN reform confined all African member states to one approach. The result was that countries like South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, all of whom have the economic power and the capacity to represent the continent, associated themselves with the Ezulwini Consensus on issues of development, UN reform and the expansion of the Security Council, even though some aspects of the AU position might have compromised their individual interests. The competition for seats continues and it is not yet clear which countries will represent Africa on the UN Security Council.

Had South Africa articulated an individual view, it would have been interpreted as being contradictory to South Africa’s foreign policy which prioritises the development of Africa as a whole. South Africa had to walk a tightrope when it came to the common AU position. Even if South Africa and other countries did not want to insist on a veto, they were subjected to the AU position. The result was the rejection of the G4 proposal, which would have led to some reform of the Security Council. Notwithstanding the importance of the veto issue, the AU’s intransigent demands on the matter cost the world progress in terms of the enlargement of the UN Security Council. Deferring the veto issue could have put Africa in a better bargaining position with the G4. The AU should have opted for a three-step approach to the veto issue.

Step 1: the focus would be on securing a deal on the reforms and Security Council enlargement in particular,

Step 2: with African representation on the Security Council, the strategy would focus on restraining the use of the veto by those who wield it, and

Step 3: the focus would be on working towards the scrapping of the veto or extending it to new permanent members.

This approach could still be implemented as we approach new AU negotiations on reform of the Security Council.

One of the things that the AU should do is to clearly define the selection criteria for African members to the UN Security Council. It is worrying that the AU went to the UN without criteria. The AU was also silent on the criteria suggested by the High Level Panel on threats, challenges and changes. It is our view that such criteria should include, among others:

  • The capacity to represent Africa and discharge Africa’s responsibilities effectively in the UN system;
  • The capacity to promote development, peace, security and stability in Africa;
  • Strong democratic credentials;
  • A reasonable level of political stability and stable state institutions;
  • A demonstrated commitment to Pan-African ideals and support of the programmes of the AU;
  • Commanding global and continental respect and recognition;
  • A demonstrated commitment to the payment of assessed contributions to both the AU and the UN.

The AU should now throw its weight behind the proposed reform package in its totality and towards the implementation of the summit outcomes instead of focusing exclusively on the veto issue. The summit did not achieve everything that the world had hoped for but it did achieve important progress across broad fronts. The UN is important to Africa as a forum to advance development, peace and security, debt and trade issues, and for the transformation of the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank). The fact that the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration and the outcome document for the September summit both had a dedicated section on Africa’s special needs should indicate to us that the UN is worth more than the two seats on the Security Council.

Endnotes
1. See 2005 Summit Outcomes and Commitments, www.un.org
2. It is called Ezulwini after the place in Swaziland where the position was adopted in February 2005.
3. The High Level Panel’s report on threats, challenges and changes is called A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility and the Jeffery Sachs report is titled Investing in Development: A practical plan to achieve the MDGs. Annan’s report is a synthesis of the two.