Opposition in shadow of the ANC colossus

Summary - Opposition political parties in South Africa operate within the framework of a “one party dominant” or “dominant-party” system and must decide which political strategies to pursue in order to best achieve their policy objectives and build and maintain voter support. In a dominant-party system this challenge is particularly difficult because of the overwhelming power enjoyed by the governing party.

Opposition strategies

In 2001 political scientist Robert Schrire defined three strategies adopted by the then opposition parties to deal with the challenge: robust opposition, co-optive opposition and co-operative opposition. Much has changed in the ranks of the South African opposition since then with the NNP dissolving into the ANC, the IFP leaving the national government and the DA facing challenges from small opposition parties formed during floor crossing. These changes suggest that Schrire’s categories should be updated to examine the political choices parties make between elections.

Budget votes and political strategy

In South Africa, the annual budget votes (over thirty in the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces) are a useful barometer for observing and interpreting how various parties pursue specific policy preferences as well as broader political strategies.

Four opposition strategies

The strong, broad strategy of opposition is exemplified by the Democratic Alliance (DA). In 2005 the DA opposed 18 of 34 budgets.

Smaller opposition parties, notably the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), tend to use the strong, narrow strategy. Each supported more than two-thirds of the government’s budgets in 2005, but opposed several specific budgets.

The weak, active strategy is typified by the IFP. In 2005 it supported all the budgets but made declarations on twelve. In 2003 it made two declarations and in 2004 it made only one, which suggests that it has adopted a more active opposition stance since leaving the national government.

Strategies of weak, inactive opposition are reflected by a party’s lack of participation in budget votes and its complete or near-complete endorsement — often by default — of the budgets.

The United Democratic Movement (UDM) followed this course in 2005 when at no stage were more than two of its nine MPs present for voting and for some budgets none was present. Over the past few years the UDM has failed to oppose any government budget.

The Independent Democrats (ID) opposed two budgets, health and defence, in divisions in 2005. Otherwise, the party supported all the budgets. Since its formation in 2003 the ID has only opposed one or two budgets per year.

Like the UDM, the ID had a poor attendance record; never during the budget vote was a majority of the party’s MPs in the house. By contrast, more than 80% of the DA’s caucus attended all the budget votes, and more than half the IFP’s representatives were present.

Effects of opposition strategies

It is difficult to measure the relative success of these strategies in the short term, one reason being that the ANC’s hegemonic majority ensures that budgets pass every time, regardless of the degree or kind of opposition expressed. Nevertheless, the success or failure of opposition political strategies can be measured in the medium term by examining poll results from one general election to the next.

A comparison of election results between 1999 and 2004 shows that “strong” strategies yield better results at the ballot box than “weak” ones.

Among “strong” opposition parties, the “broad” approach of the DA produced greater electoral growth than the “narrow” alternative of the ACDP and the FF+. And among “weak” opposition parties, the “active” strategy of the IFP was punished less than the “inactive” stances of the UDM and the NNP.

Although budget votes are useful in describing political strategies, opposition parties are rarely held to account for their votes. In mature democracies lobby groups track and publish the voting records of public representatives. Few South African pressure groups do this.

There is a strong case for increased vigilance over voting behaviour in Parliament. Closer monitoring by civil society and the media would pressure parties to remain accountable to their voters.

Opposition political parties in South Africa operate within the framework of what has been described as a “one party dominant” or “dominant-party” system2. This system differs from a one-party state in that a variety of parties compete for power. Unlike most multi-party systems, however, in the South African case the ruling party enjoys such hegemonic authority that it can amend the Constitution unilaterally if it chooses.

As in all competitive political systems, parties in South Africa must decide which political strategies to pursue in order to best achieve their policy objectives and build and maintain voter support. In a dominant-party system, this challenge is particularly difficult because of the overwhelming power enjoyed by the governing party.

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Bruce Bueno de Masquita and George W Downs describe how authoritarian governments are able to limit “political co-ordination” among their domestic political opponents3.

South Africa is clearly a democracy, and is certainly less authoritarian than it was under apartheid. Yet the ANC government is able to prevent “political co-ordination” by opposition parties through methods that are made possible only by its enormous electoral strength.

Control over the editorial policy of the public broadcaster is one such tool. Furthermore, floor-crossing in legislative assemblies at all three levels of government in the past few years has allowed the ruling party to use its patronage and power to weaken smaller parties and extend its control.

Opposition strategies

In response to these challenges, opposition parties have adopted a wide variety of strategies, with varying degrees of success.

In 2001, Robert Schrire defined three different opposition strategies in the South African political system: robust, co-optive and co-operative.

Robust opposition, practised by the Democratic Party (the predecessor of the Democratic Alliance), sought confrontations with the governing party in election campaigns, legislatures and public debates.

Co-optive opposition, practised by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), involved competing against the ruling party in elections but joining it in governing coalitions at the national and provincial levels.

Co-operative opposition, practised by the New National Party (NNP), precluded governing or campaigning with the ruling party, but involved moderate and non-confrontational rhetoric in parliamentary debate and public discourse.

Much has changed in the ranks of the South African opposition since then.

The NNP joined the DP to form the DA in late 2000, withdrew in 2001, joined a governing coalition with the ANC in the Western Cape in 2002, suffered crushing losses in the general election of 2004, and finally dissolved into the ANC in 2005.

The IFP lost control of KwaZulu-Natal and left the national government after the 2004 elections (though it remained in the provincial cabinet). The DA continued to grow but faced new challenges from small opposition parties formed during floor-crossing, particularly the Independent Democrats.

These changes suggest that Schrire’s categories need to be updated. It is necessary to look beyond the rhetorical style of opposition parties, and their decision to join or leave ANC governments, and examine the political choices they make between elections as well.

Budget votes and political strategy

The most important public choices made by political parties in representative democratic systems are their votes in the legislatures in which they hold seats. In South Africa, the annual budget votes serve as a useful barometer for observing and interpreting how the various parties pursue specific policy preferences as well as broader political strategies.

There are over thirty separate budget votes put to the members of Parliament in the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces every year4. Each budget describes how a government department intends to spend its share of the national fiscus.

In the debates that precede each vote, ministers defend their proposals and opposition parties may criticise their performance.

During the voting process itself, each party has the opportunity to vote by voice, to call for a division of the house, and/or to make a short and final declaration about the budget.

The governing party simply votes in favour of its own budgets, and generally makes declarations only in response to opposition declarations.

Opposition parties, by contrast, can express their position in five different ways (see table one): strong support (voting “aye” or “yes”); qualified support (voting “aye” or “yes” but making a declaration regarding specific objections); opposition (voting “no” or “dissent”); qualified opposition (voting “no” or “dissent” with a declaration); or strong opposition (calling for a division of the house, with or without a declaration).

Abstention or failure by opposition representatives to attend a budget vote is regarded as equivalent to supporting the budget by default. The pattern of choices made by an opposition party reveals its political strategy.

The NNP is an illustrative example, as it has changed its political allegiances and strategies several times in recent years, and these changes have been reflected in its behaviour during budget votes.

Following the 1999 elections, the NNP sat in Parliament as an independent opposition party. It opposed 10 out of the 33 budgets proposed in 2000, often on issues of specific concern to minority voters (such as arts and culture, and safety and security).

In December 2000, the NNP joined the DA. In the subsequent round of budget votes in 2001, the NNP still voted as a separate party but its voting record exactly matched that of the more aggressive DP. Accordingly, it opposed 18 of the government’s budgets — more than half of those proposed — suggesting a shift to a more “robust” opposition mode or strategy.

In 2002 and 2003, after leaving the DA but before collapsing entirely into the ANC, the NNP practised a new strategy described by its own leaders as “constructive opposition”. This shift was reflected in the NNP’s voting record. In 2002 it opposed only one budget; in 2003 it supported every budget but demonstrated residual independence by making four declarations.

In 2004, following its losses at the polls, the NNP joined the ANC in governing coalitions at the national and provincial levels (it had already joined coalitions at the local level) before crossing the floor to the ANC in 2005. In the budget votes held in these two years, the NNP supported the government completely, voting for every single budget and refraining from making a single declaration.

Four different opposition strategies

The changing patterns of the NNP’s voting behaviour suggest four distinct phases and four different political strategies (see table two). A period of strong opposition on a narrow range of issues was followed by a period of strong opposition on a broad range of issues. Later, a phase of weak but active opposition gave way to a period of weak, inactive opposition before the NNP left the opposition entirely.

These four strategies provide a useful template for describing opposition strategies used by other parties.

The strong, broad strategy of opposition is exemplified by the Democratic Alliance. In 2005 the DA opposed 18 out of 34 budgets, 10 of which it opposed by calling for a division of the house. It also made 22 declarations.

The DA’s voting behaviour in 2005 reflects a consistent pattern over several years, in which the party has voted against the government on a wide variety of budgets and called for divisions on some of the most contentious ones, such as the health budget, which has direct implications for HIV/Aids policy.

Smaller opposition parties, notably the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) tend to use the strong, narrow strategy. Each supported more than two-thirds of the government’s budgets in 2005, but opposed several specific budgets.

The ACDP, for example, supported 26 budgets, making declarations on 12 of these; it voted against four budgets verbally and opposed another 4 in divisions. The FF+ supported 23 budgets, making declarations on 10 of these; it opposed another 11, including 9 in divisions.

A weak, active strategy is typified by the IFP. In 2005, as in previous years, the IFP supported every single one of the government’s budgets, but made declarations on 12. This was an unusually large number of declarations for the party. In 2003 it made two and in 2004 it made only one, which suggests that the party has adopted a more active opposition stance since leaving the national government.

Strategies of weak, inactive opposition are those reflected by a party’s lack of participation in budget votes and its complete or near-complete endorsement — often by default — of the government’s budgets.

The United Democratic Movement (UDM) followed this course in 2005. It supported every single budget; at no stage were more than two of the UDM’s nine MPs present for voting, and for some budgets none were present at all. Over the past few years the UDM has failed to oppose a single government budget or make a declaration.

The Independent Democrats (ID) opposed two budgets in 2005, health and defence, which it opposed in divisions. Otherwise, the party supported all of the government’s budgets without making any declarations. Since its formation in 2003, the ID has never made a declaration and has only opposed one or two budgets per year.

Like the UDM, the ID had a poor attendance record; never during the budget vote process were a majority of the party’s MPs in the house. By constrast, more than eighty percent of the DA’s caucus attended all of the budget votes, and more than half of the IFP’s representatives were present as well. The ID would therefore seem to tend towards an “inactive” rather than an “active” opposition strategy.

Effects of opposition strategies

It is difficult to measure the relative success of these different opposition strategies in the short term, for two reasons.

One is that the ANC’s hegemonic majority ensures that budgets pass every time, regardless of the degree or kind of opposition expressed. The “strong, broad” opposition of the DA and the “weak, inactive” opposition of the UDM are equally ineffective when the votes are counted.

The other reason is that floor-crossing can punish opposition parties in ways that have nothing to do with their political strategies or voting behaviour, and everything to do with their size.

The “ten per cent clause” in current floor-crossing legislation leaves every party but the ANC vulnerable to the whims of a few members or even a single representative. Parliament even offers monetary incentives, in the form of salary upgrades and office allowances, for the formation of one-person parties, many of which have no clear strategy or policies whatsoever. Political fortunes have thus become disconnected from political performance.

Nevertheless, the success or failure of opposition political strategies can be measured in the medium term by examining poll results from one general election to the next (see table three).

From a comparison of election results between 1999 and 2004, it would seem that “strong” strategies yield better results at the ballot box than “weak” strategies.

Furthermore, among “strong” opposition parties, the “broad” approach of the DA produced greater electoral growth than the “narrow” alternative of the ACDP and the FF+. And among “weak” opposition parties, the “active” strategy of the IFP was punished less than the “inactive” stances of the UDM and the NNP.

It will be interesting to track future elections to determine whether these trends continue.

It is important to note that budget votes are useful in describing political strategies, but opposition parties are rarely held to account for their votes, whether on budget votes or legislative matters.

In mature democracies, of which the United States is representative, lobby groups track and publish the voting records of public representatives. Few South African pressure groups do the same.

There are, moreover, hardly any civil society organisations that are prepared to offer their public support to whichever parties support their policy goals. Most are concerned primarily with lobbying the ANC — a symptom of the ruling party’s dominance.

There is a strong case, however, for increased vigilance over voting behaviour in Parliament. Closer monitoring by civil society and the media would pressure parties to remain accountable to their voters.

Greater public attention to budget votes, even if not affecting the outcomes, would also be good in and of itself. A political system in which the people are detached from the process through which their taxes are spent cannot properly be called a representative democracy.

Endnotes
1. I am grateful for the extensive contributions of Gareth van Onselen, Democratic Alliance Director of Research and Communications, on whose research this article was largely based.
2. Giliomee, Hermann and Simkins, Charles, ed. The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1999.
3. De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno and George W Downs. “Development and Democracy”. Foreign Affairs, Vol 84 No 5 (2005). 77-86.
4. This paper does not deal with voting behaviour in the National Council of Provinces, where several opposition parties have little or no significant representation.