Zumagate and Oilgate: a critical appraisal

Summary - In what may be described as a winter hangover, two events cast a gloomy shadow over the political landscape even as the spring equinox brings the promise of long hot summer days.

They focus on, respectively, the fall and apparent resurgence of former deputy president Jacob Zuma and the rise of his successor, former minister of mineral and energy affairs and now Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

A critical point in the decline of Zuma was reached in early June when Judge Hilary Squires found Durban businessman Schabir Shaik guilty of fraud and corruption and concluded that his relationship with Zuma was “generally corrupt”.

The judgement was instrumental in persuading National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Director Vusi Pikoli to press corruption charges against Zuma. Pikoli’s decision, announced in the penumbra of the winter solstice, changed Zuma’s status from that of an African National Congress (ANC) notable under suspicion to that of a man accused of a serious offence, a position that in the view of many South Africans was untenable with his high rank as deputy president and his aspirations to occupy the presidential office itself.

President Thabo Mbeki thought so. Hence his decision to, as he put it, relieve Zuma of his responsibilities. Mbeki executed his tough task with finesse and tact.

His decision to discharge Zuma as deputy president was followed by a request from Zuma to the ANC’s national working committee to relieve him of his duties as ANC deputy president. The request — which was granted — was nullified at the ANC’s general council conference in late June and early July, leaving Zuma free to use the ANC as a platform to raise his profile as a candidate for the ANC presidency in 2007 and the national presidency in 2009.

The prospect of Zuma occupying the presidential office is discomforting, even assuming that the trial court absolves him. He has shown himself to be a man who is incapable of balancing a household budget and who in vulnerable to offers of “loans” from profiteering businessmen prepared to take advantage of his naiveté, which is what his acceptance of money from Shaik - which he has admitted – amounts to if venality is excluded.

While Mbeki’s dismissal of Zuma won significant levels of approval from a wide spectrum of political opinion, his appointment of Mlambo-Ngcuka met with serious reservations in opposition circles.

There were questions about whether she, as minister of energy and mineral affairs, was accountable for the R11 million that flowed from the state-owned corporation, PetroSA, to the ANC via Imvume Management, a private company whose CEO, Sandi Majali, is known to have close ties to high-ranking members of the ANC.

The channelling of the R11 million to the ANC from Imvume was part of a R15 million advance payment from PetroSA to Imvume for crude condensate for PetroSA’s Mossel Bay oil refinery. The transfer occurred when the ANC was in desperate need of money to finance its campaign in the pending April 2004 election.

Mlambo-Ngcuka, in her dual capacity as energy and mineral affairs minister and a member of the ANC’s national executive committee, would have had the opportunity to stare down the money channel from either end.

As minister of energy and mineral affairs she had a duty to ensure that the R15-million was used for the common good of South Africa, not to finance the ANC propaganda machine.

As a member of the ANC national executive committee she would presumably have been concerned about the state of its coffers in view of the pending 14 April election in 2004 and quizzed the ANC’s permanent officials at their Johannesburg headquarters in Luthuli House about it. To assume differently is to insult her intelligence and conscientiousness as a senior member of the ANC leadership corps.

Yet the Public Protector, Lawrence Mushwana, cleared Mlambo-Ngcuka of all allegations of wrong-doing. Arguing that neither Imvume nor the ANC are public entities and thus not within the ambit of his jurisdiction, he inexplicably concluded that the R15 million transmuted from public to private money once it was deposited in Imvume’s bank account and that Imvume was thus free to donate R11 million of it to the ANC.

The Mushwana report closed a chapter on the Oilgate saga, as the PetroSA-Imvume-ANC connection was dubbed. A new one opened, however, with the decision of the Democratic Alliance to seek the intervention of the NPA and the Director of Special Operations, aka The Scorpions, and that of the Freedom Front Plus to initiate criminal proceedings against Imvume for fraud.

In what may be described as a winter hangover, two events cast a gloomy shadow over the political landscape even as the spring equinox brings the promise of long hot summer days.

They focus on, respectively, the fall and apparent resurgence of former deputy president Jacob Zuma and the rise of his successor, former minister of mineral and energy affairs and now Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

A critical point in the decline of Zuma was reached in early June when Judge Hilary Squires found Durban businessman Schabir Shaik guilty of fraud and corruption after a marathon trial and, equally significantly, concluded that his relationship with former deputy president Zuma, was “generally corrupt”.

The judgement invited the deduction that Zuma as the “corruptee” was necessarily contaminated by the generally corrupt relationship, though the inference is without legal validity, as Zuma was not on trial.

The judgement was instrumental, however, in persuading National Prosecuting Authority Director Vusi Pikoli to press corruption charges against Zuma. He thereby reversed the decision of his predecessor, Bulelani Ngcuka, who pronounced in August 2003 that there was a prima facie case of corruption against Zuma and then added, illogically, that charges would not be brought against him.

Pikoli’s decision, announced as it were in the penumbra of the winter solstice, changed Zuma’s status from that of an African National Congress (ANC) notable under suspicion to that of a man accused of a serious offence, a position that in the view of many South Africans was untenable with his high rank as deputy president and his aspirations to occupy the presidential office itself.

President Thabo Mbeki thought so. Hence his decision to, as he put it, relieve Zuma of his responsibilities. Mbeki’s decision was amply justified in view of the maxim that a presidential candidate should be above suspicion and the adverse implications for South Africa if he had turned a convenient blind eye to the serious accusation against Zuma.

As a man Zuma, like all South African citizens, was — and is — entitled to a presumption of innocence; as a high-ranking politician aspiring to occupy the most powerful office in the political hierarchy, the imposition of a moratorium on his political activities until and unless he is acquitted was both reasonable and necessary.

Mbeki won near unanimous support from the media for his courageous — most commentators favoured that adjective — decision to dismiss Zuma. He executed his tough task with finesse and tact.

Mbeki’s commendable decision to discharge Zuma as deputy president was followed by an important related development: a request from Zuma to the ANC’s national working committee to relieve him of his normal duties as ANC deputy president. The request — which was granted — had apparently been prompted by Zuma’s need to concentrate his mind and resources on rebutting the pending charges against him.

But Zuma’s request was nullified at the ANC’s general council conference in late June and early July. The conference witnessed a huge surge of popular support for Zuma from a majority of delegates, accompanied by demands for his re-installation as an active ANC deputy president fulfilling his normal duties. The demands were acceded to, leaving Zuma free to use the ANC as a platform to raise his profile as a candidate for the ANC presidency in 2007 and the national presidency in 2009.

The upshot is that Zuma is likely to be a strong candidate if he is acquitted, even if he wins a discharge from the dock on a technicality. The widespread belief in ANC middle and lower echelons that Zuma is the victim of political machinations by his adversaries may well provide the imprimatur of popular approval that ensures his election as South Africa’s third post-apartheid president.

The prospect of Zuma occupying the presidential office is discomforting, even assuming that he emerges from his coming trial cleansed of the stigma of corruption. He has shown himself to be a man who is incapable of balancing a household budget and who is vulnerable to offers of “loans” from profiteering businessmen prepared to take advantage of his naiveté.

To label a seasoned politician as naïve is perhaps an oxymoron. But that is the only logical explanation of his acknowledged acceptance of money from business persons if venality is excluded. It is hardly a commendation for presidential office.

While Mbeki’s dismissal of Zuma won significant levels of approval from a wide spectrum of political opinion, his appointment of Mlambo-Ngcuka met with serious reservations in opposition circles.

There were questions about whether she, as minister of energy and mineral affairs, was accountable for the R11 million that flowed from the state-owned corporation, PetroSA, to the African National Congress via Imvume Management, a private company whose CEO, Sandi Majali, is known to have close ties to high-ranking members of the ANC.

The channelling of the R11 million to the ANC from Imvume was part of the R15 million advance payment from PetroSA to Imvume for crude condensate for PetroSA’s Mossel Bay oil refinery. The transfer occurred in December 2003. At the time the ANC was in desperate need of money to finance its election campaign in the pending April 2004 election. The convenience of the timing was unlikely to have been coincidental.

Mlambo-Ngcuka in her dual capacity as energy and mineral affairs minister and a member of the ANC’s national executive committee would have had the opportunity to stare down the money channel from either end.

As minister of energy and mineral affairs she arguably had a duty to ensure that the R15 million was used for the common good of South Africa and not to finance the ANC propaganda machine. As a member of the ANC national executive committee she would presumably have been concerned about the state of its coffers in view of the pending 14 April election in 2004. As a senior ANC leader she would in all probability have been told by ANC officials at Luthuli House about the party’s finicial windfall.

The Public Protector, Lawrence Mushwana, however, cleared Mlambo-Ngcuka of all allegations of wrong-doing.

He simultaneously refused to pronounce on the transfer of the R11-million from Imvume to the ANC, arguing that neither Imvume nor the ANC are public entities and thus not within the ambit of his jurisdiction as defined in the Public Protector Act. He nevertheless concluded that the R15 million transmuted from public to private money once it was deposited in Imvume’s bank account and that Imvume was thus free to donate R11 million of it to the ANC.

Instead of reassuring opposition parties, Mushwana’s 74-page report was met with a howl of protest and condemned as a “whitewash”. The damning implication of that accusation was that Mushwana, a former ANC member of parliament and deputy chairperson of the national council of provinces, had shielded the ANC from criticism rather than protecting the public interest.

The Mushwana report closed a chapter on the Oilgate saga, as the PetroSA-Imvume-ANC connection was dubbed. A new one opened, however, with the decision of the Democratic Alliance (DA) to seek the intervention of the national prosecuting authority and the director of special operations, aka The Scorpions, and that of the Freedom Front Plus to initiate criminal proceedings against Imvume for fraud.

As Douglas Gibson of the DA put it, R11 million of public money cannot be donated to the ANC without serious repercussions.