Funding parties - A necessary evil
Even a casual glance at the causes of
political scandals in the established democracies of the developed
world shows that the great majority ensue from donations to parties or
to individual politicians. South Africans know that only too well from
the row over allegations that fugitive German financier Jürgen Harksen
donated substantial sums of money to the Democratic Alliance.
Think back, in a broader context, to the controversy that shrouded
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the open questions still surrounding
President Jacques Chirac of France, some dubious gifts that have dogged
even the squeaky-clean Tony Blair of Britain, and, most recently,
donations by Enron board members and executives to political parties in
the USA. Sex scandals, though far more titillating, are badly beaten
into second place.
There are difficult issues to decide in regulating party funding.
Clearly, fighting an election is expensive, and parties in all
democratic states are virtually obliged to raise money from private
sources, even if the state does contribute.
The problem is that donors, whether corporate or individual, do not
make these contributions out of the goodness of their hearts or for
reasons of political idealism. They expect a return; and returns can
take several forms: favourable consideration of any industry's needs or
special concerns or, conversely, a hope that a donation will serve as a
kind of insurance policy against harsh, even discriminatory,
treatment.
Particularly in the USA, there is a long tradition of wealthy donors
being rewarded with ambassadorships, posts in the administration, or
other grace-and-favour positions. In the UK large donations were
traditionally the royal road to peerages, knighthoods and other
democrations. No other British prime minister in the last century
managed to do such a roaring trade in ennoblements as Lloyd George -
but, in fairness to the British, the practice of peerages-for-sale has
been substantially cleaned up.
There is clearly a strong prima facie case for strict supervision and
regulation of all forms of political donation. The problem is how to do
so. As the American experience of seeking to limit the size of
donations shows, the problems of enforcement are great, and wily
operators have been able to find their way around controls with
relative ease. Whether recent legislation, initiated after tireless
efforts by Senator John McCain, will prove any more effective remains
to be seen.
In South Africa there are no restrictions on raising funds for parties
from private sources, domestic or foreign. Apart from such private
funding, the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act of
1997 makes provision for the funding of parties on a basis that is
proportional to the size of their representation. In a single-party
dominant system such as is emerging here, obviously the lion's share of
state support goes to the ANC.
At first glance proportionality appears the most equitable way of
distributing the funds. But there are two serious problems: first, it
consolidates the main recipient's hold on its majority, enabling it
substantially to outspend potential challengers; secondly, state
funding makes no allowance for what parties can raise from private
sources which may be, and invariably is, substantially greater than
anything the state can provide. It may be impossible (and undesirable
even to attempt) to provide level playing fields for electoral
contestants, but huge inequalities in the amounts available are surely
undesirable.
Take the case of the ANC: in her book The Anatomy of a Miracle Patti
Waldmeir records that prior to the 1994 election Nelson Mandela
solicited R1 million from each of South Africa's 20 biggest
corporations, 19 of whom complied. No doubt most deemed it prudent to
succumb to Madiba's persuasiveness. It is impossible to state
categorically that this was the largest amount in corporate donations
ever raised in our electoral history, but I suspect that it may have
been.
Far more, however, has been raised by the ANC from foreign sources
since 1993. According to the DA, in its response to allegations that Mr
Gerald Morkel, the DA mayor of Cape Town, had received funding from a
shady German financier, the ANC has received US$ 240 million and £8.6
million from foreign governments between 1993 and 1999. These generous
benefactors include nasty dictators like Abacha, Gaddafi and Suharto, a
dubious democrat in the form of Mahathir Mohamed of Malaysia and
non-democrats (perhaps the most charitable description) like King Fahd
of Saudi Arabia and Sheik Zaid bin Sultan anNahayan of the United Arab
Emirates. Also on the list were two substantial tranches (in 1993 and
1994) paid by the Taiwanese government, clearly in a futile attempt to
dissuade the ANC from reneging on Mandela's undertaking not to withdraw
recognition from Taiwan.
The ANC has not audibly denied that these payments were made. The
amount, DM 99 000, said to have been given to the DA by Jürgen Harksen,
the German financier, is paltry in comparison. Mr Harksen may well be
convicted of all manner of financial shenanigans both here and in
Germany, but, one may be sure, he is not in Abacha's or Gadaffi's
league as an abuser of human rights.
An interim enquiry set up by the DA has found no evidence of improper
behaviour by Mr Morkel. But investigations continue. More significant
at this stage is the DA's swift reaction to the alleged scandal
immediately the allegations surfaced, upholding the most important
principle in these matters: transparency.
The question of foreign donations is a tricky one. Does it invade a
state's sovereignty, even if the government of that state is the
beneficiary? Perhaps not, although it may suggest the donor's attempt
to 'buy' a favourable foreign policy.
Attempts to ban all foreign funding, as the Nationalist government
tried in the days of apartheid, are unlikely to succeed. Money is
nowadays so mobile and so easily capable of being laundered that
efforts to monitor inflows would almost certainly fail. But there ought
to be a legal requirement, inserted into the Electoral Act, that all
donations above a certain amount (R10 000, R20 000?), whether foreign
or domestic, should be made public knowledge.
Transparency must be the aim; but it comes at a cost. What about the
corporation or wealthy individual who would be embarrassed at being
publicly named as a donor to a particular party? Shareholders,
employees and clients might object; and if the donation went to a party
other than the ruling one the corporation might reasonably fear that it
would be disadvantaged in its dealings with government.
As the pessimists say, for every solution there is a problem. This
problem poses an insoluble dilemma. But in a democracy surely
transparency should trump other desiderata, such as privacy?
At all events, the question of funding has become a pressing one.
Consideration ought to be given to a broad-based, non-partisan
investigation of best practice in other democratic states.
The issue underlines the importance of a free press and hard-nosed
investigative journalists. If parties are reluctant to part with the
names of their donors, and transparency has yet to be required, it will
be up to the press to dig out the information. In all of the scandals
mentioned in the opening paragraph it was the press that played major
roles in sniffing out the embarrassing information.