Voting and the fear factor
The upheaval at the Independent
Electoral Commission and the continuing difficulties over voter
registration that Patrick Laurence explores both undermine confidence
that the coming election will be free and fair. But the Helen Suzman
Foundation’s most recent opinion survey suggests a more direct threat:
the fear engendered among voters by political intolerance in their
communities.
Twenty-two per cent of the African voters interviewed say that they
would find it impossible or dangerous to disagree politically with
politicians. Slightly less, 21 per cent, feel it would be impossible or
dangerous to disagree with street and area committees, 20 per cent say
the same about traditional chiefs and 17 per cent about civics. Since
people are unlikely to say that "it is impossible or dangerous" to
disagree politically with a particular group unless they have in mind
concrete instances where people have been beaten up or killed for
expressing such disagreement, these figures show that South Africans
are still subject to many undemocratic pressures.
The situation has improved slightly over the past four years, but
nowhere can one feel that African voters are truly able to act freely.
Before the 1994 election many people thought that it would be either
difficult or impossible to live in their communities if they held
political views at variance with those of their neighbours. Election
studies that I conducted with Professor Lawrence Schlemmer at the time
found over and over again that substantial numbers of South Africans
believed that their ballot was not secret, that they tended to live in
areas dominated by only one party, and that people not supporting that
dominant party often felt worried or frightened. A mid-term survey by
the Helen Suzman Foundation in October 1996 (reported in Focus 6 and 7)
found many voters still reported feeling such pressures even though
election fever had long since subsided.
The Foundation’s most recent opinion poll conducted in October 1998 by
MarkData began by asking voters whether it was normally possible for
someone to live in their community without anyone knowing which party
he or she supported and voted for. We then compared the results with
the answers to the same question posed in February 1994. The results
are set out in broken down by race and region.
Among Whites, and especially among Asians, there has been a sharp
increase in confidence in the confidentiality of the voting process.
Many Asians approached the 1994 election in a state of great anxiety
and this was doubtless why 40 per cent (an exceptionally high figure)
then believed their vote was not secret. Happily those anxieties have
diminished: Asians are now the group least worried about voting
secrecy. African voters, however, remain as likely as in 1994 to
believe that others will know their party preference.
The most striking change is the sharp increase in the numbers of
Coloureds who believe that it is impossible to keep their political
convictions hidden from their community. This increase reflects the
heightened competition for Coloured votes that has followed the 1994
battle between the African National Congress and the National Party in
the Western Cape and the ANC’s intense efforts to reverse that verdict
ever since. There is a class aspect to this finding: working-class
Coloureds are more likely than middle-class Coloureds to feel that
their political affiliations could not be kept secret. Given the New
National Party’s (NNP) strength in working-class areas and the ANC’s
stronger hold among middle-class Coloureds, it is not surprising that
39 per cent of NNP supporters said their views would be known compared
to 29 per cent of ANC supporters. Regionally, this effect was clear in
the sharp increase in the number of Western and Northern Cape voters
who believe their party preference would be known within their
community. There has also been a sharp, and unexpected, increase in the
number of such voters in the Free State.
Compare the numbers seen in 1994 and 1998 by party support. Supporters
of the United Democratic Movement are the most likely to believe that
their communities will know how they vote. The number of Pan African
Congress (PAC) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) voters believing this
has also risen, perhaps because supporters of these two parties tend to
live among otherwise ANC-voting communities who are keenly aware of
their political rivals. On the other hand, the number of Freedom Front
(FF) and other white right-wing voters feeling pressure from within
their communities has fallen since 1994.
As in 1994 we asked voters whether there are parties or groups
controlling the area in which they live who try to make sure that they
vote in particular way. Among White and Asian voters there has been a
welcome decline in those believing this but among Coloured and African
voters the number answering positively has more than doubled. By now,
with the experience of both national and local elections, voters are
probably thoroughly aware of the dominant party in their area. In most
parts of the country awareness of territorial domination by political
parties has risen to levels previously only seen in KwaZulu-Natal. The
exception is the Eastern Cape where far fewer voters than before feel
that their area is controlled by a particular political party. This no
doubt reflects the political competition inaugurated there by the
arrival in strength of Bantu Holomisa’s UDM.
In October 1996 we asked voters how easy it would be to live in their
community if their political views differed from those of other people
living around them. No less than 46 per cent said that it would be
difficult and a further 9 per cent said it would be impossible. We
asked the same question in October 1998 and a clear improvement is
visible.
The trend is clear, too, when we looked at some of the groups who are
most affected. In 1996 no less than 83 per cent of IFP voters said that
it would be difficult or impossible for them to live in a community if
their political views differed from the majority, but in our latest
survey this figure has fallen to 60 per cent. For uncommitted voters
the proportion fell from 70 per cent to 49 per cent. But majorities in
KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Northern Cape still believe that it
would be difficult or impossible to live in that situation. Rural
Coloureds, particularly ANC voters, are most likely to feel these
community pressures, while among Africans such pressures peak among
hostel dwellers and squatters. Although IFP supporters — and African
voters in KwaZulu-Natal in general — feel such pressures most, they
also remain very high in Gauteng. In the country as a whole 49 per cent
of African still think they could not live in a community where their
political preference differed from the majority.
In the run up to the 1994 election Lawrence Schlemmer and I also
looked at how far groups such as churches, trade unions, traditional
chiefs, street and area committees influenced voter choice. We found
that most of these groups had a significant influence, especially on
African and Coloured voters. The picture was not so much that any
particular group had overwhelming influence but more that both coloured
and African voters lived within a nexus of extremely dense community
networks and pressures. White and Indian voters, on the other hand,
were not subject to such intense pressures. The Foundation’s latest
survey again looked at the influence of various groups.
We asked voters first how easy or difficult it is to disagree
politically with their family members and with their friends and
colleagues. In most countries these intimate groups have the greatest
influence on individual voting; in particular, voters tend to inherit
the political views of their parents. In South Africa these influences
exist but they are less powerful than those exerted by more external
forces.
No white English-speakers, only 8 per cent of white Afrikaans-speakers
and low proportions among Asians and Coloureds say that it would be
difficult to disagree with their family members. Among Africans 17 per
cent say that it would be difficult to disagree with family members and
4 per cent think it would be impossible or dangerous. Friends and
colleagues exert more influence among all groups, with coloureds and
Asians again more likely to be influenced by them than other
groups.
When we asked how difficult it would be for voters to disagree with
trade unions, the figures leap for all races. The figures are almost as
high for coloureds as for Africans especially among NNP-supporting
coloureds, with 30 per cent saying it would be difficult to disagree
politically with the trade unions and another 11 per cent that it would
be impossible/dangerous to do so. Among Africans only the figures are
even higher and are sharply differentiated by the type of community in
which voters live. Half of all squatters and hostel dwellers, who live
in the most densely populated surroundings, say that it would be
difficult or even impossible/dangerous to disagree with the trade
unions. The fact that no less than 30 per cent of hostel dwellers think
it would be impossible or dangerous to disagree with the unions is a
particularly alarming figure.
The levels of constraint seem even higher when we examine the
influence of the civics with almost half of all African voters saying
it would be difficult or impossible/dangerous to disagree with them.
Table 1 breaks these statistics down for African voters only by party
support. Levels of perceived duress are particularly high among IFP
supporters, followed by UDM voters. The somewhat lower figures for ANC
supporters may be explained by the fact that the civics are generally
exerting a pro-ANC influence, accordingly those who spontaneously
support the ANC may feel less pressure than those who do not.
Regionally, we found that although pressures on Africans are
predictably high in KwaZulu-Natal, the highest figures were recorded in
Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. Clearly, the pressures on voters in many
of the big reef townships are still great, while the battle between
civics and traditional leaders in the Eastern Cape has doubtless taken
its toll.
When we asked the same question about traditional chiefs, no less than
53 per cent of all African voters said it would be difficult or
impossible/dangerous to disagree with them politically. The figures are
highest among rural dwellers and people living in squatter camps among
IFP supporters and in KwaZulu-Natal, but once again the figures for
Eastern Cape and Gauteng are extremely high.
We then asked the same question about street and area committees.
Among Whites and Asians the figures are higher than one might have
expected, no doubt reflecting the influence of neighbourhood
associations of one kind or another. Once again, however, it is among
coloured and African voters that the figures are highest. When the
figures are broken down for Africans only we see that the figures peak
in KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and Gauteng but significant
constraints are evident in Mpumalanga, Northern Province and the North
West.
Then we asked voters how easy or difficult it is for them to disagree
politically with politicians. To some extent this question may be
measuring ordinary party loyalty, with voters acknowledging that once
their political leaders have taken up a position they will find it hard
to adopt independent positions themselves. Nonetheless, the overall
figures are quite striking.
Among Whites DP voters feel much more able to disagree politically
with their leaders than either the NNP or Freedom Front voters, while
among coloureds a majority of NNP voters think it would be difficult or
impossible/dangerous to disagree with political leaders. Among Africans
58 per cent said they would find it difficult or impossible/dangerous
to disagree politically with politicians, with quite remarkable figures
being seen among IFP supporters: 82 per cent of them say they would
find it difficult or even impossible or dangerous to disagree with
politicians.
Finally, we amalgamated all these figures about the influences that
African voters are subject to and expressed them in terms of the type
of community in which they lived. This shows the hierarchy of
influences at work among African voters living in different
circumstances. Among squatters and hostel dwellers the influence of
trade unions, civics, street/area committees, politicians and even
chiefs is far higher than among rural and township dwellers. The latter
are more influenced by family, friends and colleagues. Overall Table 1
suggests that at least a fifth of the African electorate is
experiencing undemocratic pressures. In practice the figure is probably
higher since groups such as trade unions, civics etc do not wholly
overlap. Probably between a quarter and a third of the African
electorate does not feel free to vote as it wishes.